rvu property
- North America > United States > New York > New York County > New York City (0.05)
- Europe > United Kingdom > England > Cambridgeshire > Cambridge (0.04)
- North America > United States > New Jersey > Mercer County > Princeton (0.04)
- North America > United States > New York > New York County > New York City (0.41)
- North America > United States > New Jersey > Mercer County > Princeton (0.40)
- Europe > United Kingdom > England > Cambridgeshire > Cambridge (0.04)
Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games
Syrgkanis, Vasilis, Agarwal, Alekh, Luo, Haipeng, Schapire, Robert E.
We show that natural classes of regularized learning algorithms with a form of recency bias achieve faster convergence rates to approximate efficiency and to coarse correlated equilibria in multiplayer normal form games. When each player in a game uses an algorithm from our class, their individual regret decays at $O(T^{-3/4})$, while the sum of utilities converges to an approximate optimum at $O(T^{-1})$--an improvement upon the worst case $O(T^{-1/2})$ rates. We show a black-box reduction for any algorithm in the class to achieve $\tilde{O}(T^{-1/2})$ rates against an adversary, while maintaining the faster rates against algorithms in the class. Our results extend those of Rakhlin and Shridharan~\cite{Rakhlin2013} and Daskalakis et al.~\cite{Daskalakis2014}, who only analyzed two-player zero-sum games for specific algorithms.
- North America > United States > New York > New York County > New York City (0.05)
- Europe > United Kingdom > England > Cambridgeshire > Cambridge (0.04)
- North America > United States > New Jersey > Mercer County > Princeton (0.04)
Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games
Syrgkanis, Vasilis, Agarwal, Alekh, Luo, Haipeng, Schapire, Robert E.
We show that natural classes of regularized learning algorithms with a form of recency bias achieve faster convergence rates to approximate efficiency and to coarse correlated equilibria in multiplayer normal form games. When each player in a game uses an algorithm from our class, their individual regret decays at $O(T^{-3/4})$, while the sum of utilities converges to an approximate optimum at $O(T^{-1})$--an improvement upon the worst case $O(T^{-1/2})$ rates. We show a black-box reduction for any algorithm in the class to achieve $\tilde{O}(T^{-1/2})$ rates against an adversary, while maintaining the faster rates against algorithms in the class. Our results extend those of [Rakhlin and Shridharan 2013] and [Daskalakis et al. 2014], who only analyzed two-player zero-sum games for specific algorithms.
- North America > United States > New York > New York County > New York City (0.05)
- Europe > United Kingdom > England > Cambridgeshire > Cambridge (0.04)
- North America > United States > New Jersey > Mercer County > Princeton (0.04)